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Palestinian exodus

The neutrality of this article is disputed.

The Palestinian Exodus is the name given to the Palestinian refugee flight that took place during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. In that flight 520,000 (Israeli estimate) to 1,000,000 (Arab estimate) Palestinian Arabs fled from their homes in what would become the state of Israel to neighbouring countries. Despite international pressure, Israel forebade them to return home and their property was either destroyed or expropriated to Israeli Jews.

Today the original refugees and their descendants amount to some 5.5-6.5 million Palestinians.

Table of contents
1 History
2 Arab leaders endorsing refugee flight
3 Contemporary mediation
4 Refugee sources
5 Refugee destinations
6 "Absentee" property
7 Books
8 See also


The history of the Palestinian Exodus is closely tied to the events of the war in Palestine that lasted from 1947-1949. One can safely assume that if there hadn't been a war, there wouldn't have been a Palestinian Exodus. That wars produce refugees is a well known fact. But few other wars in history have produced such a massive refugee flight of one ethnic group as the Palestine war did. Therefore other factors must have played a role forming it. But what they are and how they affected it is still today a very debated issue.

Transfer thinking

From the start of the Zionist endeavour in Palestine, the Jews wanted to create a Jewish state in Palestine. A state that should be built on Jewish traditions and culture. But the land was already populated mostly with Arabs abiding other religions and customs than the Jewish ones. Therefore the demographic reality of Palestine, which was dominated by Arabs, was a great hinderance for the establishment of a Jewish state and had to be changed.

The most important means to achieve that change was through aliya, Jewish immigration to the land of Israel. But the Palestinian Arab population had a much higher birth rate than the Jewish counterpart. Even with Jewish immigration, the Arab population growth firmly outpaced the Jewish one and no part of Palestine, with the exception of Tel Aviv and its surroundings, would be able to produce a Jewish majority. To make matters worse, immigration was restricted by both the Ottoman Turks and the British and relatively few diaspora Jews actually wished to immigrate to Palestine, most preferring to move to North America.

An apartheid state, akin to the one in South Africa, was out of the question for most Zionists as they wanted an egalitarian state.

The only viable solution seemed to be to partition Palestine. But however the land was partitioned, the part belonging to the Jews would contain an Arab majority or atleast a very large Arab minorty. For the Zionist leadership transfer of a large Arab population was the only solution.

The idea of transfer was not, in 1947-1949, when it actually happened, a new one. In June 12, 1895 Theodore Herzl wrote in his diary:

We must expropriate gently ... We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our country ... Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly.

To the Zionists it was of uttermost importance that the transfer plans would not become known to the world as that would lower the worlds support for the Zionists.

''When I heard these things ... I had to ponder the matter long and hard ... [but] I reached the conclusion that this matter [had best] remain [in the Labor Party Program] ... Were I asked what should be our program, it would not occur to me to tell them transfer ... because speaking about the matter might harm [us] ... in world opinion, because it might give the impression that there is no room in the Land of Israel without ousting the Arabs [and] ... it would alert and antagonize the Arabs ..." (Ben-Gurion 1944)

Moshe Sharett, director of the Jewish Agency's Political Department, declared:

''Transfer could be the crowning achievements, the final stage in the development of [our] policy, but certainly not the point of departure. By [speaking publicly and prematurely] we could mobilizing vast forces against the matter and cause it to fail, in advance. ... What will happen once the Jewish state is established - it is very possible that the result will be the transfer of Arabs." (Sharett, 1944)

In 1937 the Peel Commission gave extra fuel to the transfer thinking. It recommended that Britain should withdraw from Palestine and that the land should be partitioned between Jews and Arabs. It also recommended that 225,000 Arabs should be transferred out of the proposed Jewish state. This was a huge step forward for the Zionists. Until then, transfer hadn't been discussed as an option with outsiders but now "the Royal Commission" came to the same solution to the problem as the Zionists had. David Ben-Gurion didn't spare the supleratives when he wrote in his diary:

... and [nothing] greater than this has been done for our case in our time [than Peel proposing transfer]. ... And we did not propose this - the Royal Commission ... did ... and we must grab hold of this conclusion [i.e, recommendation] as we grabbed hold of the Balfour Declaration, even more than that - as we grabbed hold of Zionism itself we must cleave to this conclusion, with all our strength and will and faith

Despite the fact that the notion of transfer had been proposed by a royal commission and that Ben-Gurion had seen fit to speak of it in the plenum of the Zionist Congress, the subject was still very sensitive.

Alleged "Master Plan"

From the previously mentioned prevalent transfer thinking and from the actual expulsions that took place in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, some historians have drawn the conclusion that the Palestinian Exodus was a preplanned act. Even despite the fact that no central expulsion orders have been found in the archives. They mean that there was a omnipresent understanding during the war that as many Palestinian Arabs as possible had to be transferred outside of the Jewish state, and that that understanding stood behind many of the expulsions that the commanders on the field carried out and the depopulations that occurred.

Other historians are sceptical to that conclusion. They press the point that no central directive has surfaced from the archives. And certainly, if such an omnipotent understanding had existed, it would have left a mark in the vast amounts of documentation the Zionist leadership produced at the time.

The supporters of the master plan theory argue that the missing central directives haven't been found because either it was deliberately omitted or the understanding of the significance of explusion was so widespread that no directive was necessary. They claim that the Zionist leadership in general and Ben-Gurion in particular were very aware how histiography worked. What would be written about the war and in which light Israel would be presented was so important that it was worth making an intentional effort to hide those of their actions that might seem reprehensible.

Additionally, some historians have interpreted clauses from Plan Dalet as the central directive, i.e. the master plan. Specifically the section instructing commanders to destroy and depopulate villages that contained a hostile and/or difficult to control population.

First stage of the flight, December 1947 - March 1948

During these months the climate in Palestine began to get hot. Hostilities between Jews and Arabs increased and general lawlessness spread as the British declared to end their mandate in May 1948. War was seemingly inevitable. Middle and upper-class families from urban areas withdrew to settle in neighbouring countries such as Transjordan and Egypt. Perhaps as many as 75,000 left in those months. There was also cases of outright explusions such as in Qisarya where roughly 1000 Palestinian Arabs were evicted in February. Irgun and Lehhi played an important role in terrorizing the Palestinian population.

Most of the refugees from this period probably thought that they soon would return, just as they had done after the Great Arab Uprising 1936-1939.

This first flight contributed to demoralize the Palestinians and left them virtually without any leadership.

Second stage of the flight, April 1948 - June 1948

The fighting in these months was concentrated to the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv area. It is logical that it was therefore also in this area that most depopulations took place. The notorious Deir Yassin massacre in early April, and the exaggerated rumours that followed it, helped spread fear and panic among the Palestinians.

On May 14, 1948, when Israel's independence was declared, there were already 250,000 refugees on the road.

Third stage of the flight, July 1948

The largest single expulsion of the war began in Lydda and Ramla July 14, in which 60,000 inhabitants were forcibly expelled on the orders of Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin wrote in his diary:

What would they do with the 50,000 civilians in the two cities ... Not even Ben-Gurion could offer a solution ... and during the discussion at operation headquarters, he [Ben-Gurion] remained silent, as was his habit in such situations. Clearly, we could not leave [Lydda's] hostile and armed populace in our rear, where it could endangered the supply route [to the troops who were] advancing eastward .. Ben-Gurion would repeat the question: What is to be done with the population?, waving his hand in a gesture which said: Drive them out! 'Driving out' is a term with a harsh ring ... Psychologically, this was one of the most difficult actions we undertook. (Soldier of Peace, p. 140-141)

Additionally, widespread looting and several cases of rape took place during the evacuation. In total, 300,000 Palestinians became refugees in this stage.

Fourth stage of the flight, October 1948 - November 1948

This period of the exodus was characterized by Israeli military accomplishments which was met with resistance from the Palestinians to be made refugees. The Israeli military activities limited itself to the Galilee and the sparseley populated Negev desert. It was clear to the villages in the Galilee, that if they left, return was far from imminent. Therefore far fewer villages was spontaneously depopulated than previously. Most of it was due to clear, direct cause, including brutal expulsion and deliberate harassment. About half a dozen massacres was committed in the Galilee by the IDF during this stage of the war.

Operation Hiram, which was the Israeli military operation that conquered the upper Galilee, is one of the examples in which a direct expulsion order was given to the commanders:

Do all you can to immediately and quickly purge the conquered territories of all hostile elements in accordance with the orders issued. The residents should be helped to leave the areas that have been conquered. (October 31, 1948, Moshe Carmel)

Between 1-200,000 Palestinians left in this stage most going to Lebanon.

Arab leaders endorsing refugee flight

From Israeli official sources it has long been claimed that the refugee flight was in large part instigated by Arab leaders. For example, Yosef Weitz wrote in October 1948:

''The migration of the Arabs from the Land of Israel was not caused by persecution, violence, expulsion [but was] deliberately organised by the Arab leaders in order to arouse Arab feelings of revenge, to artificially create an Arab refugee problem." (Jewish National Fund official Yosef Weitz, 1948)

It has been claimed that during the period preceeding the 1948 war and particularly during the invasion of Arab powers into Palestine, the Arab High Command called for the Palestinian population to leave their homes. This view has long been the accepted narrative in the Israeli government discourse and, until the 1980s, in most books written from a Zionist viewpoint.

However, this view has always been rejected by Palestinian writers and is not consistent with modern research on the war. In the 1980s when the Israeli archives about the war opened to researchers, the Israeli New Historians began to question this view. For example, concerning the alleged evacuation order, or orders, issued by Arab leaders, Benny Morris wrote:

Had such a blanket order (or series of orders) been given, it would have found an echo in the thousands of documents produced by the Haganah's Intelligence Service, the IDF Intelligence Service, the Jewish Agency's Political Department Arab Division, the Foreign Ministry Middle East Affairs Department; or in the memoranda and dispatches of the various British and American diplomatic posts in the area (in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, and Cairo); or in the various radio monitoring services (such as the BBC's). Any or all of these would have produced reports, memoranda, or correspondence referring to the Arab order and quoting from it. But no such reference to or quotation from such an order or series of orders exists in the contemporary documentation. This documentation, it should be noted, includes daily, almost hourly, monitoring of Arab radio broadcasts, the Arab press inside and outside Palestine, and statements by the Arab and Palestinian Arab leaders. (Tikkun, Jan/Feb 1990, p80)

In "The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem", Morris also notes Haganah intelligence reports from May 5-6 referring to a Jordanian campaign calling for the Palestinians to stay put and for those who left to return. Other documents describe muftis urging their populations to hold their ground and even threatening those who leave with punishments.

It should be pointed out that the question has to real significance in international law. The resolutions that has been passed, urging for the Palestinains to be allowed to return, does not differentiate between those who left on their own initiative and those who left for other reasons.

Contemporary mediation

The UN was from the very beginning involved in the conflict. In the autumn of 1948 the refugee problem was a fact and how it should be settled was discussed. Count Folke Bernadotte said on September 16:

No settlement can be just and complete if recognition is not accorded to the right of the Arab refugee to return to the home from which he has been dislodged. It would be an offence against the principles of elemental justice if these innocent victims of the conflict were denied the right to return to their homes while Jewish immigrants flow into Palestine, and indeed, offer the threat of permanent replacement of the Arab refugees who have been rooted in the land for centuries.

UN Resolution 194 which was passed on December 11 1948 and reaffirmed every year since, was the first resolution that called for Israel to let the refugees return:

the [Palestinian] refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.

Refugee sources

The refugees came from all parts of today's Israel. Most came from the Jerusalem, al-Ramla, Jaffa and Tulkarm districs which were the most densely populated. In those districts, virtually all villages were depopulated and the towns with mixed populations cleansed from Arabs. In the Galilee, which didn't see heavy fighting before the end of the war, many villages remained intact even though every village and town that was occupied there (with the exception of Nazareth) was evicted. In total, 85% of the Palestinians living inside Israels borders were evicted.

District Depopulated towns & villages Refugees
Acre 3047,038
Ramleh 6497,405
Baysan 3119,602
Gaza 4679,947
Haifa 59121,196
Hebron 1622,991
Jaffa 25123,227
Jenin 6 4,005
Nazareth 5 8,756
Safad 7852,248
Tiberias 2628,872
Tulkarm 1811,333

Source: Note: Seemingly exact numbers of refugees are given in the source, but no exact numberss are actually known and for the above values, only 1-2 digits are significant.

Refugee destinations

Most refugees did not leave Palestine immediately when their homes were captured by Israel. Instead they left for neighbouring parts of the land until those parts to were conquered by Israel. Because they were walking their options was limited.

The West Bank absorbed 38% of the refugees, the Gaza 26% and Lebanon 14%. The remaining 22% was divided between Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Transjordan proper. A minor portion, the upper and middle-class refugees, that fled in the first stage ended up further away from Palestine because they could afford real transportation.

DestinationNumber of refugeesPercentage
West Bank 375,200 38,23%
Gaza Strip 244,400 26,80%
Jordan 94,000 10,22%
Lebanon 131,600 14,53%
Syria 94,000 10,22%
Iraq 3,000 0,18%
Total 924,200 100,00%

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"Absentee" property

In 1950, The Absentee Property Law was passed in Israel. It was the law that made it domestically legal in Israel to confiscate the property and land that the departed Palestinians had left behind them, so called "absentees". Even Arabs who never left Israel, and received citizenship after the war, but stayed for a few days in a nearby village had their property confiscated. About 32,000 Palestinians became "present absentees" - persons that were present at the time but considered absent.

How much of Israel's territory consists of land confiscated with the Absentee Property Law is uncertain. According to the Israeli Custodian of Absentee Property, 70% of the territory:

The Custodian of Absentee Property does not choose to discuss politics. But when asked how much of the land of the state of Israel might potentially have two claimants - an Arab and a Jew holding respectively a British Mandate and an Israeli deed to the same property - Mr. Manor [the Custodian in 1980] believes that 'about 70 percent' might fall into that category (Robert Fisk, The Land of Palestine, Part Eight: The Custodian of Absentee Property, The Times, December 24, 1980

The Jewish National Fund's estimate quite a bit higher at 88%:

Of the entire area of the state of Israel only about 300,000-400,000 dumums ... are state domain which the Israeli government took over from the mandatory regime [2 percent]. The JNF and private Jewish owners possess under two million dumum [10 percent]. Almost all the rest [i.e 88 percent of the 20,225,000 dunums within the 1949 armistice lines] belongs at law to Arab owners, many of whom have left the country. (Jewish National Fund, Jewish Villages in Israel, p.xxi, quoted in Lehn and Davis, The Jewish National Fund)

The absentee property played an enormous role in making Israel a viable state. In 1954 about one third of Israel's population lived on absentee property. Of 370 new Jewish settlements established 1948-1953, 350 were on absentee property. As Moshe Dayan put it in an often quoted speech before students at the Israeli Institute of Technology in 1969:

We came here to a country that was populated by Arabs, and we are building a Hebrew, Jewish state. In a considerable portion of localities we purchased the land from the Arabs. Instead of Arab villages Jewish villages were established. You even do not know the name of the villages and I do not blame you, because those geography books no longer exist. Not only the books, but the villages no longer exist. Nahalal was established in the place of Mahalul, Gevat in the place of Jibta, Sarid in the place of Hanifas and Kefar Yehoshu'a in the place of Tel Shaham. There is not a single settlement that was not established in the place of a former Arab village. (Dayan, March 19, 1969; as quoted in Haaretz, April 4, 1969)


See also